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MEMORANDUM

TO:

25X1A

28 March 1951

FROM:

SUBJECT: Certain Considerations Affecting Services' Attitude toward
NIE-27

1. There are two separate but related issues in connection with Taiwan on which the Army and the Air Force, on the one hand, and the Navy, on the other, disagree. Although I do not pretend to know all the ramifications of this problem, I believe the following presents an accurate and probably fairly complete picture. Mr. Langer may find this useful background in his relations with the services in connection with this paper. 25X6

2. The first disagreement deals with

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3. The second disagreement deals with the capability of the Chinese Communists to successfully launch a surprise, commando-type assault.

a. The Army and Air Force apparently feel that this is beyond the realm of possibility, presumably because of the strength and reliability of the Nationalist military.

b. The Navy feels strongly that it is not only possible, but that it may develop at any time and would probably be sufficient to turn the island over to the Communists (presumably because of the weakness and unreliability of the Nationalists).

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4. These differences are fundamental and have existed since early last summer. They appear to stem from the division of responsibility among the services in the China-Korea-Japan area. Although all services are under the Far East Command (MacArthur), the Army and the Air Force have the primary responsibility for conducting the Korean campaign and large segments of the available Far Eastern fleet have been placed in support of this mission. The Navy has primary responsibility for the "neutralization" of Taiwan, but in a sense is a residual claimant for ships under MacArthur's command.


5. To the extent that the Air Force and Army can demonstrate that the Taiwan situation is secure, it can argue for the maximum use of the Far Eastern fleet in Korean waters. On the other hand, the Navy, if it is to accomplish its mission, must bid for the same ships and can do so only by painting the Taiwan picture in the most sombre hues.

6. It will be inevitable that one or the other points of view will prevail and that a dissent will be automatically forthcoming.

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7. My own view and that of my colleagues (and, I believe, of OIR) is that



We also believe that the possibility of a sneak attack should be explored. I might point out that with few exceptions the reporting (both political and military) from Taipei corroborates the views expressed in this paragraph.

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